Human collective behaviors like herding, fads, and market crashes are often explained in terms of low-level adaptive or reactive dysfunctions. Implicit in such "non-cognitive" explanations is that sophisticated, experienced, and motivated populations will be less susceptible to such phenomena. But if human-unique higher-level reasoning mechanisms can also drive complex collective behaviors, then emergent complexity may be more common to human affairs than previously supposed, and harder to suppress.
Introduction
Cultural norms, fads and fashions, and economic bubbles and busts are all behaviors that can emerge spontaneously from disorganized human collectives (1, 2) . And new organizational forms made possible by the Internet promise to leverage the power of collectives and foster new kinds of social production (3) (4) (5) . However, our limited understanding of how groups self-organize prevents us from fully mitigating the defects and harnessing the power of human collective behavior. Large-scale human social dynamics remain difficult to model or produce in the laboratory and, despite many advances in the computational social sciences, theorists continue to rely on restrictive assumptions that are in many cases ungrounded. For example, prominent models from across the social sciences explain complex collective behaviors in terms of "low-level" individual processes such as habits, reactions, emotions, biases, reinforcement learning, or imitation (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) . Despite wellestablished rational models of herding (1, 2, (12) (13) (14) (15) , behavioral game theoretic research continues to reinforce this bias by emphasizing the power of rational, motivated, or experienced behavior to suppress complex non-equilibrium social dynamics (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) .
However, if these more "cognitive" higher-level reasoning mechanisms can themselves drive collective behavior away from economic predictions, then complex emergent phenomena may be endemic to even the most carefully engineered human social systems.
Flocking and hopping in repeated games
Studies of simple adaptive game dynamics are giving increasing attention to endogenously formed emergent dynamics (8, (22) (23) (24) , particularly in complex games-those with many players, choices, and repetitions. We focus here on a collective behavior that we call "flocking with hopping." Flocking is normally understood as the clustering of agents in both their positions and velocities (9, 10) . For our purposes, it will be defined for economic games in a way that treats position as game choice and velocity, or rate, as the magnitude of the difference between consecutive choices. Flocking occurs with small or decreasing "choice distance" and "rate distance," defined as the mean or median differences of group members' choices and rates from each other in a given round (SI). We define hopping as a noncontinuous but monotone sequence of choices through an ordinally ranked choice space (examples below).
Flocking mechanisms (without hopping) are usually described in terms of "low-level" reactive, adaptive, or emotional processes (6, 10, 25) , and draw heavily from the study of non-human animal collective behavior (9, 11, (26) (27) (28) . By contrast, previous observations of hopping (without flocking) have attributed it to a "high-level" cognitive process: iterated reasoning (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) . A well-known game called the Beauty Contest is known for eliciting bounded strategic iterated reasoning. In the game, participants receive a reward for guessing the number, x ∈ [0, 100], that is p (typically p=2/3) of their group's mean guess. Since participants know that all others are trying to guess the same number, they must anticipate that others will anticipate their anticipations, to some depth. These iterations eliminate intermediate strategies from consideration and cause choices to "hop" discontinuously through the choice space. While the analytic procedure that yields the game's solution decrements from the maximum choice down through the whole [0, 100] strategy space, a typical human choice set might move, for example, from 40 to 30 to 15 to 9 (c.f. (29) ).
Iterated reasoning is often invoked for its ability to suppress endogenous non-convergent or non-equilibrium game dynamics (16) (17) (18) (19) 35) , but it has also been theorized to coexist with endogenous collective behaviors similar to flocking (36-39). 1 We make a distinction from flocks with an incremental rate of one (23) , by defining flocking with hopping as flocking with rate above one.
Folk theorems offer an underspecified theory of game dynamics
Game theory's folk theorems introduce simple conditions that create in repeated games infinitely many Nash equilibrium strategies (40) (41) (42) (43) , where Nash equilibrium is a classic definition for the stability of game outcomes. But folk theorems offer no predictions for the specific form that repeated game dynamics will take, and no account for why the same group dynamic might appear independently in games of very different types. In this sense, folk theorems fail to provide a positive theory of repeated games. Furthermore, single-shot games continue to serve as the starting points that theorists use to study their repeated versions, so any failure of a game's single-shot properties to influence modeling of its repeated version is important to be able to explain.
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Three games
We present results from three economic games, the well-known Beauty Contest, and the Mod Game and Runway Game that we introduce.
As described above, participants in the multiple-player Beauty Contest game receive a reward for guessing the number, x ∈ [0, 100], that is p of their group's mean guess (29, 30, 33) . The game originally gained attention because, instead of converging immediately upon the Nash equilibrium strategy-zero-participants "hop" through numbers at a rate consistent with 0-3 depths of iterated reasoning. In repeated versions of the game, players anchor on the previous round's winning choice (rather than the maximum, 100), and choices converge quickly toward zero.
The Mod Game is a generalization of Rock-Paper-Scissors that is useful for the study of human collective behavior (31, 32) . In the game, fewer than m players choose an integer {1, ..., m}. Choice x dominates ("beats") only choice x-1, such that players earn one point for each other player whose choice was exactly one below theirs, with the exception that choice 1 dominates choice m. This "intransitive dominance" structure, directly reminiscent of Rock-Paper-Scissors, gives the Mod Game a unique mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. The game's structure makes iterated dominance ill-defined for the Mod Game (since all strategies are beaten by some other), and game theory offers no reason to suspect behavior consistent with iterated reasoning.
The Runway Game, introduced here, was developed to narrow the possible explanations for flocking and hopping in the Mod Game. The game is unusual for having a real-valued, unbounded strategy space and, in its main variation, no Nash equilibrium. As in the Mod Game, each of multiple players earns one point for choosing a number precisely one above another's number. However, its strategy space is defined on the real numbers. Still, any choice x is dominated by some other choice (namely x+1). Going further, all mixed-strategies in the Runway Game are also dominated, giving it no single-shot Nash equilibria in either mixed or pure strategies (SI). The Runway Game gains a unique pure strategy equilibrium with a very small change, the addition of an "outside" choice that guarantees zero earnings.
However, we will see that players are effectively indifferent to this change in the solvability of the stage game.
All three games were repeated and, in all games, players received anonymized but otherwise full information about each previous rounds' payoff outcomes.
Method
Mod Game
83 paid participants in 28 groups of size 2-7 played 200 rounds. Groups played 100 rounds each of positive-sum and zero-sum versions of the game. In the zero-sum rounds, a player that was scored upon lost a point for every point gained by the earning player, while the positive-sum rounds imposed no such penalty. We took various measures to prevent any choice in the strategy space from being more psychologically salient than others, and we also provided players with a "randomize button" to reduce the cognitive costs of equilibrium play (more details in the SI). Players received anonymized information on each round's payoff outcomes.
Runway Game
In our first experiment with this game, 59 players in 17 groups of 2-6 played two blocks of 75 rounds in zero-sum and positive-sum conditions. Players received anonymized information on each round's payoff outcomes. In a second experiment we tested 22 groups of 133 students. This experiment was a strictly positive-sum design whose two blocks paid either 2¢ or 20¢ per point. More importantly, this version of the game was modified to give the Runway Game a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium, specifically an outside option that guaranteed zero points in earnings.
Beauty Contest
We reanalyzed data from two classic studies of the repeated Beauty Contest (29, 33) to calculate within-group, within-round choice and rate distances over time. The first study was based on 7 groups of 15-18 playing 4 rounds (with p either 2/3 or 1/2), and the second had 55 groups of 3 or 7 playing 10 rounds (p either 0.7 or 0.9).
Results
We robustly elicit flocking with hopping in three very different complex games.
Mod Game
Mod Game groups quickly self-organize into a collective flocking behavior in which individuals "hopped" together around the strategy space ( Figure 1 ). Players had a mean hop size of 2.2, meaning that, on average, a player who selected choice 10 in round x tended in round x+1 to play choices 12 or possibly 13. From round to round, the average minimum difference between a player's choice and the choices of others decreased significantly over time (χ 2 1=26, p<0.001; Table S2 , also see Figure 3 ), except in the zero-sum condition, in which distances showed a net increase with time (χ 2 1=40.2, p<0.001; same Table) . This emergent clustering on a small subset of choices satisfies the first requirement of flocking. As for the second requirement, players showed the same pattern in rate distance as they did in choice distance: the differences between the sizes of players' hops decreased with time in the non-zero-sum conditions, except for an increase in the zero-sum rounds (χ 2 1=39.2; χ 2 1=38.5; both p<0.001; Table S3 ). This convergence on shared 'positions' and 'velocities' through choice space satisfies our definition of flocking for game dynamics. One factor contributing to the persistence of flocking could be its profitability to players, since group outcomes involving clusters are much more efficient than the uniformly random play of the single-shot Nash solution.
In the Mod Game's circular strategy space, flocking implies cycles. Simulations have shown that replicator agents can converge upon similar non-convergent cyclic flocking dynamics in positive-but not zero-sum Rock-Paper-Scissors games (23) . These models correctly predict the flocking we report, although they fail to predict the "rate > 1" hopping that accompanies it. Our findings also challenge the claim that adaptive learners will become less susceptible to non-convergent behavior when outfitted with iterated reasoning capabilities (16, 17, 19) .
In only 5% of choices did players explicitly select random strategies. Players tended to maintain the same rate from round t to t+1 as from t+1 to t+2. When they did "accelerate," it tended to be only incrementally by 1 or -1 ( Figure S3 ). Group size did not significantly affect Tables S2-S4) .
Runway Game
Qualitatively, groups in the first Runway Game experiment tend in the first few rounds to cluster on single-digit integers above zero before self-organizing into a group that climbs from round to round through the positive integers ( Figure 2 , full data Figure S16 ). Players hop up the strategy space with a median rate of 3 (mode 2; distribution in Figure S10 ). They coordinate overwhelmingly on the natural numbers, with only 4.2% of choices being negative or non-integer. They also flock: the median choice distance in a round was 7 (mode 2) and the median rate distance was 6 (mode 1). On these key qualities, behavior in the Runway Game matches that of the Mod Game. Flocking is tighter and hops are larger in later rounds (χ 2 1=377; χ 2 1=14; both p<0.001; Tables S8 and S9 ). Zero-sum versions of the game show less clustering and no difference in the magnitude of hopping (χ 2 1=94, p<0.001; χ 2 1=0.08, p=0.77).
Results from following experiments are consistent with those of the first. In addition to the second design, we conducted a third experiment (reported in the SI) that repeated the second with an online Mechanical Turk subject pool whose 133 participants were permitted to attend repeat sessions. This heavily contaminated design allowed us to test the effects of extreme experience, at the cost of making it more of an anecdote than an experiment (since its 17 sessions were made statistically dependent). In these second and third experiments (Figures S17-S18), the median magnitudes of hopping are respectively 3 and 9, median choice distances are 3 and 3.5, and median rate distances are also 3 and 3.5. The Runway
Game had a Nash equilibrium in both experiments, but this difference from Experiment One seems to have no effect; qualitatively, players in both were indifferent to the presence of the Nash equilibrium, selecting it intentionally in less than 1% of rounds and continuing to flock and hop as in the first experiment. 2 The effect of more rounds of experience is in all three experiments increased flocking (tighter clustering) and significantly larger hops in later rounds (χ 2 1=377; χ 2 1=14; both p<0.001). Larger groups and higher pay levels are also associated with larger hops (χ 2 1=328,
Beauty Contest
In her work with the first repeated Beauty Contest, Nagel found evidence that participants adjust their depth of reasoning incrementally up or down in response to feedback on how deep they "should have" reasoned in the previous round. After sufficiently many rounds of feedback, players' mutual applications of such adjustments to each other should produce clustering. Since flocking in the repeated Mod and Runway games seems to be COGNITIVE MECHANISMS FOR FLOCKING 9
attended by iterated reasoning, we hypothesized that hopping and flocking might co-occur in the repeated Beauty Contest as well.
It is established that choices in the Beauty Contest become closer to each other as they approach zero, due to the exponential decay of choices toward equilibrium in later rounds.
However, the choice and rate clustering we propose is over and above the spurious type that, due to the game's scoring rule, must attend play in later rounds. To measure clustering due specifically to endogenous flock formation, controlling for more trivial mechanisms, we normalized choices in each round relative to the benchmark set by the previous round's winning choice (SI). We find evidence for flocking in both experiments (Figure 3 , top 2 rows). It seems to develop very quickly, even within the four rounds of Nagel's experiments.
Since the existence of hopping is already well-established in the Beauty Contest, we report latent flocking with hopping in two seminal experiments using this game. Figure 3 compares six experiments on three games to give evidence that flocks emerge over time. Models integrating all three games find increased flocking-lower choice distance and rate distance-with time (χ 2 1=85.8; χ 2 1=99.9; both p<0.001; Table S13 ). and these patterns disappear in randomly reshuffled groups (χ 2 1=2700; χ 2 1=11.9; both p<0.001; Table S13 ). We interpret these findings as evidence for group-level norms in how many iterations group members expect each other to perform.
Cross-game evidence for emergent flocking
Cross-game evidence for emergent within-group norms
Discussion
One flocking behavior in all games
Players in each game self-organize a behavior we name flocking with hopping, even though existing theory does not predict any similarity between these three multiplayer games.
In single-shot form, one game has a unique pure strategy equilibrium, the second has a unique mixed strategy equilibrium with no focal points, and the third has no Nash equilibrium at all. In repeated form, the folk theorems permit arbitrarily complex dynamics in each game, but fails to predict that the same complex dynamic will emerge. Flocks emerge with or without high pay levels, with or without Nash equilibria, and are also robust to group size, subject pool, and both within-and between-session experience. Zero-sum versions of the Mod and Runway games damp flocking, an effect that has been predicted by non-linear physicists for a wide range of games (8, 22, 23, 44) .
The fact that groups become increasingly predictable in their moves over rounds is a challenge for some theories, but is nicely predicted by a herd-like behavior in which players "go with the group." Groups also learn over time to make larger hops (to "go faster"), but in a restrained way that does not diverge and remains predictable.
The robustness of flocking in these games makes it ideal for understanding the role of endogenous group formation in human social dynamics.
Hopping due to ungrounded iterated reasoning
The most likely explanation for hopping is that players come to conceive of these games as evoking oneupmanship via iterated reasoning. There are four reasons to support iterated reasoning as the explanation for hopping: 1) participants often mentioned after sessions that they had used iterated reasoning to inform their choices; 2) the most common rates in all three games were consistent with the 1-3 steps of iterated reasoning common in the literature (45); 3) it provides a more parsimonious and psychological explanation than alternative theories (such as boredom, a time-lagged reinforcement learner, or a human implementation of autoregression); and 4) our findings in the Mod and Runway Games inspired our successful prediction of flocking in a third game in which iterated reasoning is already well-established.
Despite these arguments in favor of iterated reasoning in the Mod and Runway games, we also report some evidence that challenges a straightforward interpretation of its role in producing hopping: 1) players sometimes expressed very high rates despite having only 7-10 seconds to iteratively reason to the corresponding depth, 2) higher rates do not take substantially more time to produce, 3) rates do not diverge to very high levels, and 4) the hop sizes of some groups, which could exceed 10, would have to correspond to strategic iterated reasoning performance with unprecedented and unrealistic depth. These problems may be resolved if we introduce a distinction between iterated reasoning as cognitive process and iterated reasoning as "mental model." Suppose that a simple decision heuristic (such as "increment previous choice by n") can produce a hopping behavior consistent with the fully deliberative iterated reasoning process. If all players think of each other as applying the full process, but each in fact uses the cognitively cheap heuristic, then iterated reasoning is no longer applied by anyone as a cognitive procedure for generating behavior, but it continues to be applied by everyone as a way of understanding how others play the game.
An emergent mental model
We take the reliable emergence of a common collective behavior as evidence that the Whatever commonality these games are ultimately found to share, it will not be found in their stage-game solutions. The mental models we observe seem to emerge without regard for the one-shot formal structures of these games. This insensitivity challenges the relevance of elementary game-theoretic concepts to the study of "complex" games with many players, choices, and rounds. In the extreme case of the Runway game, participants self-organize the same behavior regardless of whether or not the game even has a Nash equilibrium.
Researchers such as Sugden argue against the sufficiency of game structure in constraining the game conceptualization process (50), and imply an increasingly close relationship between cognitive science and game theory (51). To explain the emergence of the mental models driving flocking in the Runway and Mod games, we hypothesize that random nonstrategic choices in early rounds accidentally created small clusters of choices. These then became a type of focal point that broke the strategic and perceptual symmetries of both games and created the shared mental models we observe. One implication is that people develop mental models not before, but during, play.
Endogenous norms influence hopping behavior
If the conceptualization of complex games occurs at least in part during play, then variations in early game dynamics may cause variation in how a conception manifests. This may explain the wide variation in different groups' median hop sizes (Figure 4 ). Researchers have long debated whether a participant's expressed depth of iterated reasoning is determined by their own cognitive limits, or instead by the limits they expect of others (21, 29, 30, (52) (53) (54) (55) . We offer a third possibility: participants express a "normed" depth of iterated reasoning that emerges only within that group, as a result of groupmates' previous patterns of mutual adaptation to each other. This norm-based theory of reasoning depth, however complex, makes a simple prediction. If expressed reasoning depths are sensitive to endogenous effects, then the data will simultaneously show homogeneity in rates within a group and heterogeneity in rates across groups. Figure 4 shows this for all three games, and, additionally, that randomly reshuffling groups eliminates the evidence for emergent norms over time (Table S13) .
Conclusion
In repeated versions of the Beauty Contest, Mod, and Runway games, groups produce a single efficient, non-convergent, non-equilibrium collective behavior called "flocking with hopping". Our tests demonstrate the robustness of this behavior over varying pay levels, on multiple populations, in some zero-sum versions, and with extensive experience. These three game environments lack any formal resemblance to each other, so the emergence of one collective behavior in all three is an important challenge for the game theoretic literature on repeated games. Because of the evidence that endogenous social norms constrain iterated reasoning, these games are also a challenge to the sentiment that complex non-equilibrium social dynamics are driven by low-level reasoning processes and attenuated by high-level processes. In other words, being smart is as likely to increase as decrease the complexity of strategic social interactions. Ultimately, this work promises a deeper integration of behavioral game theory with the cognitive sciences: if game conceptualization is an active process that can occur during game play, then an understanding of game behavior will require an understanding of the process by which mental models co-evolve with experience. And if nonconvergent, non-equilibrium behavior is endemic to a diversity of abstract game settings, even among groups that are motivated and experienced, then such emergent complexity may be an unexpectedly common feature of real world social dynamics. illustrates a perfect flock whose hop sizes increase continuously from 1 to 5, and d. plots integers [1, 24] randomly. The spiral patterns in the first two columns are consistent with the predictions of flocking and hopping. Figure S5 
